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ABSTRACT 
 Systems engineering practices in the Navy consider operational availability as a 
system attribute determined by system components and a maintenance concept. A better 
understanding of the risk attitudes of system operators and maintainers may be useful in 
understanding potential impacts to operational availability that the system operators and 
maintainers have. The method presented in this thesis synthesizes the concepts of 
reliability, risk attitudes, and utility theory to quantify the effect that risk attitudes of 
systems operators and maintainers have on system operational availability. The method 
consists of four main steps providing the engineer with a risk-attitude-adjusted insight 
into the system’s “utility” as determined by a system “value” parameter, which, in this 
case, is system reliability. This is accompanied by a final step that may be taken by 
systems engineers that uses the output of the previous four steps to inform any necessary 
iterations to the system design process. If it is deemed necessary to redesign the system 
(Step 5), the systems engineers will likely choose new system components and/or alter 
their configuration; however, redesign is not limited to physical alteration of the system. 
Several other options, which may be more practical depending the system’s stage in the 
life cycle, address this issue from a maintainability or supportability perspective rather 
than a reliability perspective. 
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The Navy is a unique and complex organization with high tempo and extensive 
operational commitments. To perform well in such a dynamic environment and continue 
to meet the demand of prompt and sustained combat, operational availability is of 
paramount importance. Systems engineering practices within the Navy generally consider 
operational availability to be a system attribute determined by the quality and arrangement 
of the components within the system as well as the system's maintenance concept. One 
potential method of improving system engineering processes is by augmenting existing 
design considerations by measuring the risk attitudes of the individuals who will be 
interacting with the system and analyzing individuals’ risk attitudes to predict the impact 
on operational availability. 
A better understanding of how risk attitudes of individuals specifically involved 
with operating and maintaining a system may be useful in modifying how a system is 
designed and/or operated to address potential impacts to operational availability from 
individuals’ risk attitudes that are not what systems engineers would otherwise have 
anticipated. The method developed in this thesis is intended to be implemented early in the 
systems engineering process during overall conceptual system design and architecture to 
aid in maintenance concept development. The method is targeted toward new systems; 
however, the method may be applicable to existing systems scheduled to go through 
periods of major overhaul or upgrade. 
This author's methodology synthesizes the concepts of reliability, risk attitudes, and 
utility theory to quantify otherwise qualitative characteristics of system operators and 
maintainers (SOM) as they relate to operational availability. The process consists of four 
main steps providing the engineer with a risk-attitude-adjusted insight into the system’s 
“utility” as determined by a system “value” parameter, which in this case is system or 
component reliability. This is accompanied by a final step that may be taken by systems 
engineers that uses the output of the previous four steps to inform any necessary iterations 
to the system design process: 
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1. Identify key characteristics of the system. 
2. Determine the risk attitudes of SOMs. 
3. Develop the utility function. 
4. Evaluate the utility of the system. 
5. If necessary, implement adjustments to or redesign the system. 
As systems engineering is an iterative and recursive process, should the engineer 
require execution of the fifth step, it may be necessary to perform steps four and five until 
reaching a satisfactory outcome. 
The first step in determining how risk attitude impacts the operational availability 
of a system is to identify some of the key system attributes, including reliability. The 
reliability characteristics of each component are multiplied against each other pursuant to 
the overall reliability equations governed by component arrangements to determine the 
system's overall reliability level. This overall reliability level is then used as the “value” of 
the utility function in a utility theory approach. The next step of the method is to understand 
the aspirational risk attitudes of the personnel involved with the operation and maintenance 
of the system beginning with first selecting an appropriate risk attitude test. The (Domain-
Specific Risk Taking) DOSPERT test covers five domains of risk-taking/aversion 
including ethics, finance, health/safety, recreation, and social (Blais and Weber 2006). 
While an individual’s risk attitude in each domain has an impact on the operational 
availability of the system, the impacts are not uniformly consistent across the set of 
domains for a given value. After determining both the SOM’s individual risk attitude in 
each of the domains, as well as determining the impact the domain itself has on operational 
availability, multiplying the two values together and summing each of the products 
provides a single value, Rtot, which is representative of the SOM’s overall risk attitude and 
expected impact on the reliability of the system with which he or she is interacting. Often 
times, ρ is even better defined by taking the average across a pool of SOMs’ Rtot results. 
The decision to analyze only one individual versus a group of SOMs should be based on 
whether many SOMs work on a specific system or if one dedicated SOM will work on that 
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system. In the third step, utility theory is used to determine how this value impacts the 
"utility" of the system as it relates to reliability by generating the utility function in 


















 , (1) 
where ρ is the risk coefficient, which is inversely related to the risk tolerance of the SOM 




 , (2) 
where Rtot represents the overall risk attitude of the SOM and Fs represents a scaling factor 
indicating the impact of risk attitudes on system reliability. In the investigation of the 
impact of risk attitude on the reliability of the system (Equation 1), the value, x, is the 
reliability of the system and the utility [u(x)] is the risk-adjusted impact to the expected 
operational availability of the system. In the fourth step, the systems engineer relates the 
utility function to the system described in step one. Determining the revised system utility 
provides the systems engineer with several options. The system may still be of sufficient 
utility that despite the effects of the risk attitude of the SOM(s) and thus the engineering 
process may continue unhindered; however, there may be sufficient impact to require 
addressing the issue before proceeding further in the engineering process. If it is necessary 
to redesign the system (Step 5), systems engineers will likely choose new system 
components and/or alter their configuration; however, redesign is not limited to physical 
alteration of the system. Several other options which may be more practical depending the 
system's stage in the lifecycle address this issue from a maintainability or supportability 
perspective rather than reliability. For example, efforts could be made to utilize specialized 
training to reduce the system's mean time to repair. Additionally, efforts to reduce 
administrative or logistics delays may prove of use in boosting the system's operational 
availability levels; however, if any combination of these methods proves insufficient, it 
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The Navy is a unique and complex organization with high tempo and extensive 
operational commitments. To perform well in such a dynamic environment, the Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral John Richardson, released a document titled A Design 
for Maintaining Maritime Superiority that states that “The United States Navy will be ready 
to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea” (Richardson 2018). 
This unified approach to naval strategy suggests that to meet the demand of prompt and 
sustained combat, operational availability is of paramount importance. 
B. THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY APPROACH 
Systems engineering practices within the Navy generally consider operational 
availability to be a system attribute determined by the quality and arrangement of the 
components within the system as well as the system's maintenance concept. In this 
approach to operational availability, no explicit consideration is given to the characteristics 
of the personnel interacting with the system as it assumes any individual responsible for 
operating or maintaining the system will follow all guidance set forth in the maintenance 
concept (Waeyenbergh and Pintelon 2002, 299). Continued reliable performance of the 
system is contingent on the system being properly operated and maintained in accordance 
with said guidance. In the Navy, this responsibility falls to the officers and enlisted 
personnel to promote and enforce procedural compliance as a means to ensure the system 
achieves designed availability levels. While this is a valid approach, it does not account for 
the potential of the system operator/maintainer (SOM) to be in non-compliance with the 
maintenance concept. 
C. THE OBJECTIVE 
In order to better predict the availability of a system, engineers must account for 
not only material considerations, but also the human element (Dhillon 2009, 2). One 
potential method of improving system engineering processes in this way is by augmenting 
2 
existing design considerations by measuring the risk attitudes of the individuals who will 
be interacting with the system and analyzing individuals’ risk attitudes to predict the impact 
on operational availability. A better understanding of how risk attitudes of individuals 
involved with operating and maintaining a system may be useful in modifying how a 
system is designed and/or operated to address potential impacts to operational availability 
from individuals’ risk attitudes that are not what systems engineers would otherwise have 
anticipated. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can risk attitude information collected from SOMs be linked to the reliability 
of the systems with which they interact to improve naval systems design for increased 
operational availability? 
 How can risk attitudes be measured? 
 How can risk attitudes be linked to operational availability? 
 How can system operational availability be improved in light of this 
information? 
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
This thesis is limited by the following scope, limitations, and assumptions, many 
of which provide the basis for future work. 
1. Scope 
Many psychological factors have the potential to impact operational availability, 
including changes in anthropometric, sensory, and physiological conditions (Wickens and 
Kramer 1985, 316). However, the scope of this investigation is limited to examination of 
risk attitudes as the factor under examination. Determining the interrelationships between 
the above mentioned psychological factors and the effects they have on risk attitude are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, the investigation holds all other psychological 
3 
factors aside from risk attitude as constant to demonstrate the impact of risk attitude itself 
on the operational availability of a system. 
2. Limitations 
This investigation is limited to publicly available research. No existing risk-attitude 
data for the population of interest (system operators and maintainers) is available, so 
representative but fictional risk attitude data is provided. The relationships, however, 
remain the same. Additionally, no empirical data is available to define the strength of risk 
attitude against other possible factors, such as physiological considerations, sufficient 
system training, or environmental conditions, on operational availability. Therefore, the 
coefficients used to represent the relationship of risk attitude to operational availability 
have been developed using engineering judgement but are not supported with either 
empirical data or from the literature. The engineering system data used to determine 
operational availability is representative of data found in naval systems but is intentionally 
fictional in nature to preserve confidentiality of data sources. Additionally, this 
investigation is limited to systems that are maintained by humans. 
3. Assumptions 
Several simplifying assumptions are made as part of this investigation. In the 
opinion of the author, the assumptions are reasonable and appropriate. This section presents 
and discusses the assumptions. 
It is assumed that the risk attitude data of individuals involved with the operation 
and maintenance of naval systems has a measurable impact on system reliability and can 
be reasonably isolated from confounding factors. Furthermore, it is assumed that the risk 
domains covered in this investigation are dimensionally correct and applicable to the 
domain of engineering. Research on other distinct populations in several domains indicate 
that this is a reasonable assumption. For instance, risk attitude of patients to medical 
procedures has been isolated (Butler et al. 2012). In another instance, the risk attitudes of 
native German speakers have been investigated (Johnson, Wilke, and Weber 2004). 
Significant additional work within the domain of risk attitudes for specific situations and 
populations has been conducted and is available in the literature (Breuer et al. 2016; 
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Farnham et al. 2018; Mishra and Lalumière 2011; Van Bossuyt et al. 2013; Zhang, Foster, 
and McKenna 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable to make these assumptions. 
In the context of this thesis, the assumption is made that the population of interest 
for risk attitude data is the operators and maintainers of naval systems, and more 
specifically the sailors who serve in those roles. Further, in alignment with research in the 
field of risk attitudes, it is assumed that sailors evaluate a decision where there is risk (e.g., 
option A carries a 20% chance of failure and a large reward while option B carries a 5% 
chance of failure and a small reward) in a favorable or unfavorable way and then act 
accordingly (Blais and Weber 2006; Van Bossuyt et al. 2013). Furthermore, this author 
stipulates that risk aversion has no effect on system performance, as it is indicative of the 
procedural compliance found in neutral risk attitudes. 
In addition to assuming the risk attitudes of the population are representative of 
those of the SOMs, this author has assumed the risk attitudes of the SOMs will not change 
appreciably over the system lifecycle. Due to the structure of naval career progression, the 
average set of SOMs remains consistent as new personnel arrive and others progress to 
their next assignments. Given the lifespan of the system in comparison to the tour length, 
this ensures that any variations in risk attitude across a variety of factors would be mitigated 
across the life of the system (Bond et al. 2016; Doornbos 2018; Yardley et al. 2016, 10) 
making this a reasonable assumption. 
While this author could have developed a unique psychometric risk assessment tool 
to aid in answering the research question, he chose to generate a generic data set utilizing 
the structures from existing psychometric risk surveys available in literature (Blais and 
Weber 2006; Johnson, Wilke, and Weber 2004; Van Bossuyt et al. 2013). The limitation 
of this approach is that the risk attitude information is from a generic population and not 
specific to maintenance and professional activity risk attitude information from sailors 
involved in maintenance activities. However, based on the literature, this approach can still 
produce some useful results (Farnham et al. 2018; Johnson, Wilke, and Weber 2004). 
Further, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a systems engineering analysis method 
rather than a new psychometric risk assessment tool. In future work, it may be valuable to 
develop a psychometric tool. 
5 
The method developed in this thesis is intended to be implemented early in the 
systems engineering process during overall conceptual system design and architecture to 
aid in maintenance concept development. The method is targeted toward new systems and 
the assumption is made throughout the thesis that only new systems are being analyzed. 
However, the method developed in this thesis may be applicable to existing systems 
scheduled to go through periods of major overhaul or upgrade. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This section presents background information necessary to understand the context 
of the research presented in this thesis, a review of existing literature that directly relates 
to the contribution of this thesis to the literature, and the framework in which this research 
exists. 
A. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY 
To understand the implications of the CNO’s demand for an operationally ready 
force, one must understand the concept of availability. Engineering literature discusses 
availability in three main ways, with each of them increasing in complexity. The first of 
the three is inherent availability. Inherent availability is the simplest of the three forms and 
is determined by design; it takes into account only the hardware characteristics and assumes 
ideal support (Defense Acquisition University 2001, 2; Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 
2011, 313). Achieved availability is slightly more complex, and while continuing to assume 
an ideal support environment, it makes provision for scheduled, preventive maintenance 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 493). The last, and most robust, form of availability is 
called operational availability and takes into consideration, in addition to all of the factors 
included in inherent and achieved availabilities, the logistics and administrative delays 
associated with the system (Defense Acquisition University 2001, 2; Krueger, Walden, and 
Hamelin 2011, 313). This research focused on operational availability as the central metric 
as it is the most representative of the environment the system will be operating in and 
factors in the impact of limited resources (Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011, 313; Pryor 
2008). 
In the book, Systems Engineering and Analysis, Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 
493) defines operational availability as the “probability that a system or equipment, when 
used under stated conditions in an actual operational environment, will operate 
satisfactorily when called upon.” This is reiterated in the Defense Acquisition University 
Operational Availability Handbook as “the probability that a system will be ready to 
8 
perform its mission or function under stated conditions when called upon to do so at a 
random time” (Defense Acquisition University 2001). Figure 1, taken from Pryor’s 
“Methodology for Estimation of Operational Availability as Applied to Military Systems,” 
illustrates operational availability in a temporal perspective (Pryor 2008, 422). 
 
Figure 1. Operational Availability by Time. Source: Pryor (2008).  
Pryor presents this illustration mathematically, defining operational availability as 




𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
 (1) 
 
System uptime and downtime can then be disaggregated further to reveal the three 
main factors contributing to a system’s operational availability. According to the 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE), operational availability is a 
“function of operating time (reliability) and downtime (maintainability/supportability),” 
which are shown as system uptime and downtime respectively (Krueger, Walden, and 
9 
Hamelin 2011, 312). The first of these three factors, reflecting the expected system 
operating time, is reliability. 
1. Reliability 
According to INCOSE, reliability is the likelihood a system will work when 
expected (Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011). This is similar to, but not the same as, 
availability. While availability is the ratio of system uptime to total time, reliability is 
simply the likelihood the system will be available when called upon. A system with low 
reliability has a low percentage chance of being in working condition when called upon 
(system downtime), which suggests over a given period of time, a system with lower 
reliability will have more downtime in that period compared to a system of higher 
reliability. Presented in terms of operational availability, this suggests that for a given set 
of conditions over a specified time, a system with lower reliability will also have lower 
operational availability. 
According to Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011), reliability for an individual 
component is a function of the time period of interest and the mean time between failure 
(MTBF). The most commonly used reliability function that describes component reliability 
is the exponential reliability function. Blanchard and Fabrycky also disclose that not all 
types of equipment have the same failure characteristics; therefore, not all equipment will 
adhere to the formula presented in Equation 2. Exploration of non-exponential equipment 
failures is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, a more thorough discussion of 
reliability models can be found in the Handbook of Reliability Engineering (Pham 2003). 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−
𝑡
𝑀 , (2) 
where t represents the time period of interest and M represents the MTBF of the component 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 413). The inverse of MTBF is the failure rate, which is 
expressed as number of failures per given period. Under this model, increasing the period 
of interest for a given MTBF results in a lower reliability. Similarly, increasing the MTBF 
(lowering the failure rate) of a component for a given period raises the reliability of the 
component. Since reliability is a function of time and typically reliability calculations are 
given for a specified period of time, MTBF is often used as a stand-in (Defense Acquisition 
10 
University 2001). If no maintenance is performed on a system with a given MTBF, its 




 , (3) 
where MTTR is the mean time to repair the system and function of its design. This is the 
most rudimentary conceptualization of availability and referred to as inherent availability 
(Ai).  
There are several schools of thought regarding methods to improve system 
availability. Some focus on system hardware attributes where changes to hardware can 
increase system availability while other approaches focus on component configuration or 
reformation of the maintenance concept (Fleischer, Weismann, and Niggeschmidt 2006; 
Waeyenbergh and Pintelon 2002). The most direct method is the hardware approach, which 
generally suggests replacing components with lower levels of reliability with components 
that have higher levels of reliability (Whitelock 1953). Replacing components that have 
lower reliability with components that have higher reliability is often very costly, especially 
as the expected reliability of the components reaches very high levels (Wang, Loman, and 
Vassiliou 2004). 
In order to understand system reliability, the reliability of individual components 
must be gathered together, and a system-level reliability calculation must be developed. 
Reliability block diagrams (RBDs) are a very common method of analyzing system-level 
reliability from the component level (Guo and Yang 2007). Figure 2 shows an RBD for a 
generic system with three components placed in series configuration.  
 
Figure 2. Series Reliability Diagram 
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This is the simplest form of a three-component system with a system reliability 
given by Equation 4: 
𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠 = (𝑅𝐴)(𝑅𝐵)(𝑅𝐶) , (4) 
where RA, RB, and RC are the reliabilities of each of the components and the system 
reliability is their product (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 419). Component configuration 
capitalizes on the use of series and parallel configurations to improve the reliability of a 
system (Coit and Smith 1996). There are two main methods of providing redundancy. The 
first is to place an energized, redundant component in parallel with the original. The second 
method differs only in that the component is de-energized until the failure of the original 
component (Coit 2001). This is the difference between active and standby redundancy 
(Amari and Dill 2010). The equivalent reliability for a number of identical components 
placed strictly in parallel is represented by Equation 5: 
𝑅𝑒𝑞 = (1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝)
𝑛
) , (5) 
where n represents the number of components placed in parallel. Figure 3 shows a series-
parallel system configuration with component B placed in parallel with a redundant part. 
 
Figure 3. Series Parallel Diagram 
The reliability for this series-parallel system is defined by Equation 6: 
𝑅𝑠𝑦𝑠 = (𝑅𝐴)(1 − (1 − 𝑅𝐵)
2)(𝑅𝐶) , (6) 
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where the reliability of a component placed in parallel with a second identical component 
is represented by (1-(1-Rcomp)
2) (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 420–21). 
Methods that focus on maintenance practices improve system reliability through 
the use of preventive maintenance to increase the effective MTBF of the system (Hong et 
al. 2014; Swanson 2001). When using preventive maintenance to increase system 
reliability, system downtime is determined not only by component failure, but also by 
scheduled preventive maintenance (Defense Acquisition University 2001). When used in 
reference to a maintenance concept, the MTBF of a system is re-designated MTBMu or the 
mean time between unscheduled maintenance. Its counterpart is MTBMs, the mean time 
between scheduled maintenance. The terms are then combined and referred to as MTBM, 
or the mean time between maintenance. Mean time between maintenance, representing the 
mean time between maintenance activities, whether corrective (MTBMu) or preventive 











System downtime is then measured by the mean active maintenance time, ?̅?, 
determined by both corrective and preventive maintenance times (Pryor 2008, 421). This 




 , (8) 
where MTBM represents system uptime and ?̅? represents the mean active maintenance 
time. As MTBM is a characteristic of the maintenance concept of the system, it is 
considered part of the design for maintainability. 
Once again, the purpose in discussing reliability is to understand its impact on a 
system's availability. While reliability is the dominant factor in determining a system's 
inherent availability, inherent availability fails to consider maintenance as a factor in 
determining the system's uptimes and downtimes (Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011, 
313). A more realistic understanding of the system's availability requires inclusion of 
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factors related to system maintenance, necessitating a discussion of maintainability as a 
factor in determining system availability (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 493). 
2. Maintainability 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) describe maintainability as a “design characteristic 
(a design dependent parameter) pertaining to ease, accuracy, safety, and economy in the 
performance of maintenance functions.” Systems designed to be maintainable capitalize 
on the system's maintainability characteristics to improve reliability, leading to better 
operational availability for the overall system; and while the reliability of a system is 
largely determined by the system’s design, it can be positively or negatively impacted by 
the frequency and quality of maintenance performed on the components (Swanson 2001, 
238). To ensure the system remains reliable throughout its operational life, one must ensure 
that the systems are properly maintained. In her article on linking maintenance strategies 
to performance, Swanson presents three strategies commonly used in the approach to 
maintenance (Swanson 2001). She names the first as reactive, in which maintenance is 
conducted in response to a failure in the equipment. In this method, MTBM is equivalent 
to MTBMu. She describes the proactive strategy as one incorporating predictive and 
preventive maintenance practices to extend the MTBF of system components. In the event 
desired availability levels cannot be reached by improving system reliability through 
preventive maintenance, one may need to address the system design by providing 
redundancy in the form of additional components or functional paths in critical areas 
(Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011). This is what Swanson refers to as the aggressive 
strategy, which is centered on the improvement system function and design. She also notes 
that as the strategies move from reactive to aggressive, the increased system performance 
comes at the cost of increased requirements for resources, training, and integration. 
To this end, in their article on maintenance concept development, Waeyenbergh 
and Pintelon have expanded on maintenance strategies by suggesting maintenance 
strategies be introduced to the integrated business concept, and note that as maintenance 
strategies become more integrated, there has been “a shift from failure-based to use-based 
maintenance and increasingly towards condition-based maintenance” with increased 
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emphasis on the production facilities in terms of reliability, availability, and safety (2002, 
300). 
Because the tradeoff between the frequency of preventive maintenance and system 
uptime can be complicated, many researchers have begun searching for solutions to 
optimize system availability. Monga, Zuo, and Toogood (1997), propose a genetic 
algorithm to optimize the balance between preventive and corrective maintenance actions. 
Coit and Smith (1996) take a similar approach. According to Coit and Smith, the procedure 
involves taking an initial population composed of solutions vectors (set of possible 
component configurations) and applying an objective function, which allows the 
component configurations to mutate over subsequent iterations until reaching a feasible 
solution. 
While this method is useful for optimization of maintenance, it rests on the 
assumption of ideal logistics support, meaning that while the method is able to provide 
more resolution than inherent availability, it fails to include factors outside of the 
component characteristics and maintenance design. In an organization with limited 
resources, it is not often reasonable to assume system reliability and maintainability 
characteristics are the only significant factors in determining the system's availability 
(Defense Acquisition University 2001). For this reason, it is important to consider the 
supportability characteristics of the system. 
3. Supportability 
Supportability is a system aspect primarily concerned with the logistics and support 
mechanisms by which a system is acquired, installed, and subsequently maintained. 
Blanchard and Fabrycky define logistics as "that part of the supply chain process that plans, 
implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverse flow and storage of 
goods, services, and related information between the point of origin and the point of 
consumption in order to meet customer requirements" (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 
568). However, with regard to operational availability, the most significant supportability 
aspects focus on system maintenance and support, and the integrated logistics support (ILS) 
system that provides the materiel. Taken from DoDI 5000.2, the Integrated Logistics 
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Support Guide from Defense Systems Management College defines ILS as “a disciplined, 
unified, and iterative approach to the management and technical activities” designed to 
accomplish four objectives (Defense Systems Management College 1994, 1–1). The first 
objective is to make considerations for system support integral to the design. The second 
objective is to develop coherent, design-focused support requirements to achieve readiness 
objectives. The third objective is to obtain adequate support. The fourth and final objective 
is to provide support at minimum cost throughout the system's operational phase. 
Integration of ILS characteristics in the calculation of availability leads to the most robust 
and relevant form of availability to operating forces; operational availability. In relation to 
system uptime and downtime, impacts from ILS consist of two parts which are then 
combined with the mean maintenance downtime to provide an overall system downtime. 
The two parts of ILS that have an impact on system downtime are administrative delay 
time (ADT) and logistics delay time (LDT) (Pryor 2008, 421). Administrative delay time 
is the amount of time that the system remains inoperable for administrative reasons 
including organizational constraints, administrative approval processes, or personnel 
assignment priories. Logistics delay time is the downtime incurred due to lack of parts 
availability arising from delays in obtaining facilities to perform maintenance, test 
equipment with which to diagnose issues, or lack of replacement part stock. System 
downtime is, thus, defined by Equation 9: 
𝑀𝐷𝑇 = ?̅? + 𝐴𝐷𝑇 + 𝐿𝐷𝑇 , (9) 




 , (10) 
where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance and MDT is the mean maintenance 
down time, which includes active maintenance time, logistics delay, and administrative 
delay. Reducing administrative and logistics delay minimizes system downtime and 
improves operational availability. The emphasis on reduction in these two areas is 
embodied in the Lines of Effort (LOE) contained in the CNO's Design for Maritime 
Superiority. Logistics is addressed in the LOE Blue in the discussion of ashore logistics 
posture and in LOE Green in the discussion of the use of additive manufacturing. Similarly, 
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administration is addressed in LOE Green which emphasizes the achievement of “high 
velocity outcomes” (Richardson 2018). 
The operational demands of today's systems have driven research into quantifying 
the impact of supportability on the availability of a system such as that of Kumar and 
Knezevic (1998) in their article on analysis of supportability as a critical factor in system 
operational availability. In their paper, Kumar and Knezevic propose different ways in 
which supportability concepts can be developed and optimized to address different rates of 
system failure and repair time. The three cases addressed were constant failure rate with 
constant repair time, constant failure rate with arbitrary repair time, and arbitrary failure 
rate and repair time. 
Having discussed reliability first as a means of understanding a system's inherent 
availability, expanding the discussion to include maintainability further refined system 
availability to an expression of achieved availability. This discussion of supportability has 
addressed the final factors for determining a system's availability, administrative and 
logistics delay, to provide the most robust form of availability: operational availability. 
While integrating the variables of reliability, maintainability, and supportability provides 
all of the factors necessary to understand operational availability, this discussion can be 
further refined by addressing the human element of the system and understanding how it 
impacts the reliability, and ultimately availability, of a system. 
B. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Naval vessels are comprised of systems and can be described as systems of systems 
(SoS) (Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011, 11). Each system on a naval vessel is operated 
and maintained by personnel(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 536–38) . With such a 
significant effort placed on reliability as a factor in maximizing operational availability 
(Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 2011, 312–13), and with the understanding that a 
significant portion of the negative impacts on the reliability of the system are caused by 
human interaction with the system (Perrow 1983, 522), substantial effort must be made and 
great care taken to understand how to best design the systems to accommodate (and in 
some instances withstand) these interactions with SOMs. These considerations fall under a 
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domain of engineering called human systems integration (HSI) (Army Research 
Laboratory 2017). 
According to the Handbook of Human Systems Integration, HSI is a concept, both 
technical and managerial in nature, that leverages methods and technologies useful to the 
implementation of the concept during systems integration (Booher 2003). It defines the 
top-level objectives of HSI to be the management of the relationships between SOMs, 
government and industrial organization stakeholders, and system design, production, and 
operation methods and processes. Correspondingly, others like Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2011, 536) convey HSI as a perspective that requires understanding of the physical system 
elements, to include humans, and their interfaces. 
Two benefits of addressing the human element from an HSI perspective are 
significant reductions in waste and substantial system productivity and performance 
increases (Booher 2003, 2). According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, one of the goals of 
system design is to ensure effective and efficient operation and maintenance throughout 
the system life cycle according to the needs of the customer (2011, 549). They continue by 
stating that for the system to be effective it must be able to perform all operational and 
maintenance functions, in a specific manner, in a designated time frame, and without error. 
In addition, all of which, they note, must occur at minimum cost over the life cycle of the 
system. Finally, they conclude by stating the goal of the process as the maximization of all 
system-level goals to include availability, dependability, and performance (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2011, 549). 
HSI, according to the Department of Defense (DoD), is comprised of seven 
domains: Manpower, Personnel, Training, Human Factors Engineering (HFE), System 
Safety, Soldier Survivability and Health Hazards (Army Research Laboratory 2017). While 
improvements in operational availability can be achieved for operational systems in many 
of these domains, improvements made during the design phase are reserved for the HSI 
domain of HFE, which attempts to account for these traits in the realms of human 
psychology, among others. This is relevant to this investigation as the model proposed by 
this author was designed to implement information gleaned from analysis of human factors 
to improve HSI during the design phase. 
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C. USABILITY AND HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING 
To maintain high operational availability for a system, in addition to reliability, 
maintainability, and supportability; one must address the usability characteristics of the 
system. Hardware and software design alone does not guarantee good system usability 
(operability) no matter how well done (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011); and to this end, the 
system must take into consideration a variety of human factors. Blanchard and Fabrycky 
insist that in addition to reliability and maintainability, consideration of human factors must 
be undertaken starting with conceptual design (2011, 550). 
A variety of factors must be taken into consideration from a usability perspective 
when designing a system including the anthropometric characteristics, sensory factors, 
physiological factors, and psychological factors of the SOM as well as relationships 
between these factors and the larger system design (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 536). 
Anthropometric characteristics involve human dimensions such as arm span, weight, and 
height (Perrow 1983, 523). Sensory factors include sight, sound, smell, and touch, while 
physiological factors relate to environment impacts such as temperature, humidity, or noise 
level (Booher 2003, 557). Finally, psychological factors relate to personal attitudes, risk 
tolerance, and motivation (Dhillon 2009, 36; Perrow 1983; Krueger, Walden, and Hamelin 
2011, 330–31). The psychological factors are of special interest to this research as they 
relate to the likelihood that a SOM will perform his or her duties as expected.  
Failure to take human factors into consideration during system design often results 
in poor usability which can lead to decreased reliability of the SOM as an effective part of 
the system. To counter this outcome, some engineers have proposed conducting human 
reliability analyses in an effort to mitigate the effects of the perceived “weak link in the 
chain” (Dhillon 2009; Dougherty and Fragola 1988). Dhillon expounds upon this point by 
giving examples of different types of maintenance errors. He notes six main categories of 
errors including “recognition failures, memory failures, skill-based slips, knowledge-based 
errors, rule-based slips, and violation errors.” None of these errors is desirable and 
effectively constitutes abuse of the system. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 562) note that 
most emphasis in HFE focuses on system abuse as a result of unintentional actions by the 
SOM; however, in addition to the abuse resulting from unintentional acts, systems also 
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suffer from abuse arising from willful acts of negligence or malevolence. Willful acts of 
abuse are typically violation errors, which warrant investigation of the psychological 
component of HFE (Dhillon 2009, 66–67). This does not imply that a system cannot be 
designed without expressly addressing these factors, but rather available information on 
the psychological disposition of the SOMs should be incorporated to improve the system 
design process (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 536). 
D. PSYCHOLOGY 
Many human factors engineers have backgrounds in engineering psychology, 
which often proves useful for basic human factors work; though, it has its limitations when 
trying to influence organizational desires (Perrow 1983, 523). Wickens and Kramer (1985) 
define engineering psychology as “the study of human behavior with the objective of 
improving human interaction with systems” (307). They expand by illustrating its 
connection to three related disciplines: HFE, ergonomics, and human skilled performance. 
HFE has already been discussed above and will not be expounded upon any further. 
Ergonomics, they assert, is similar to HFE, but it focuses more specifically on physiology 
and environmental factors. Lastly, they speak briefly on human skilled performance as it 
pertains to psychology, which addresses issues arising in the performance of complex tasks 
without the express objective of using the data to improve system design.  
For purposes of this thesis, this author has explored engineering psychology as it 
pertains to psychological factors and their influences on maintenance. System Engineering 
and Analysis defines psychological factors as pertaining to the relationship between job 
performance and the human mind with its emotions, traits, and behavior patterns 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 548). It continues by asserting that even if all other factors 
have been optimized, a poor psychological disposition in a SOM increases the probability 
of diminished performance. While Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011, 548) note physiological 
factors may greatly influence psychological factors, this author has chosen to hold the 
physiological factors constant to isolate the impact of the psychological factors on 
maintenance outcomes properly. 
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E. RISK 
Existing research in risk attitudes with regard to risk tolerance and risk aversion 
across personal domains is available in the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) 
Scale (Blais and Weber 2006) and the Engineering-DOSPERT (E-DOSPERT) for 
engineers in their professional practice across several domains (Van Bossuyt et al. 2013). 
The DOSPERT recognizes five dimensions of risk: ethical, financial, health and safety, 
recreational, and social. Blais and Weber define risk attitude as the “willingness to trade 
off units of perceived risk for units of perceived return” (2006, 34).  
While prior research on risk attitudes in engineering led to the ability to perform 
risk attitude-adjusted decision-making at the stakeholder level (Van Bossuyt et al. 2012), 
more recent research relating risk attitudes with ethical decision-making and associated 
behaviors has provided a foundation for the exploration of risk attitudes in engineering at 
the level of the technician (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011; Booher 2003; Dhillon 2009, 68, 
83). Using risk attitude data of SOMs is exemplary of aspirational, rather than predictive, 
risk-based system design. The aspirational versus predictive nature of different risk attitude 
survey techniques was noted by Pennings and Smidts (2000) when investigating lottery 
methods and psychometric methods of assessing risk attitude for Dutch hog farmers. Van 
Bossuyt et al. (2012) further investigated lottery methods and psychometric methods of 
risk attitude assessment from the perspective of engineers and found similar correlations 
to Pennings and Smidts. Out of this work, a method for understanding aspirational risk 
attitudes of engineers can be used to develop aspirational system designs was developed 
and implemented into trade-off studies to be used during space mission concept planning 
(Van Bossuyt 2012; Van Bossuyt, Tumer, and Wall 2013). Aspirational system designs 
use aspirational risk attitudes of stakeholders collected from psychometric risk surveys 
such as the DOSPERT or E-DOSPERT surveys to guide the design process toward designs 
that are more optimal from an aspirational risk attitude perspective and that likely would 
not have been designed had the stakeholders not investigated their aspirational risk 
attitudes. Conversely, predictive system designs use lottery method-derived risk attitude 
information which is predictive in nature to develop designs that the stakeholders would 
have likely designed themselves. Aspirational system design has generally been used to 
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analyze the risk attitudes of the ultimate decision-maker in order to make design decisions 
in his or her absence (Van Bossuyt et al. 2012). While this research also adheres to the 
aspirational philosophy of risk attitudes in the context of system design, it differs from 
previous aspirational design research in that this research analyzes the risk attitudes of the 
SOMs, rather than the major stakeholders as in the case of Van Bossuyt et al (2012) to 
inform the system design process. 
F. THE DESIGN PROCESS 
In order to contextualize the research presented in this thesis, it is important to 
understand the systems engineering design process and how this research fits within the 
process. Figure 4 depicts the components of the systems engineering "Vee" model (one of 
several models used to describe the systems engineering process), beginning with the 
decomposition and definition sequence, proceeding to integration and verification as the 
design moves from concept to operation. 
 
Figure 4. Vee Process Model. Source: Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(2011). 
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System effects related to risk attitudes manifest themselves during system 
operation, on the integration and verification side of the systems engineering “Vee” 
diagram (during the system operation phase), which can be factored into the decomposition 
and definition side of the diagram both iteratively and recursively during system design. 
The usefulness of employing a systems engineering approach to risk-based design is that 
it helps the Navy to better understand the relationship between risk attitudes in operators 
and maintainers of naval systems and their effects on system operational availability. In 
understanding how system operation and maintenance is likely to be conducted, engineers 
can apply lessons learned to both equipment overhauls and ground-up system development. 
Successful implementation of risk attitude-informed adjustments during the design phase 
through aspirational system designs as described above and as implemented in this research 
may provide improved system performance through matching system design to realistic 
operational and maintenance requirements, which may result in increased system 
operational availability. In order to implement risk attitude-informed adjustments, one 
method that has seen significant prior use is utility theory (Kirkwood 1997; Pennings and 
Smidts 2000; Van Bossuyt et al. 2012). 
G. UTILITY THEORY 
Utility theory is a method of decision making based on assigning a utility to a 
parameter based on its value (Fishburn 1970, 1). In his book, Utility Theory for Decision 
Making, Fishburn describes the fundamental theorem of utility as one that utilizes 
axiomatic preferences (values) to mathematically assign a number (utility) to each 
alternative in such a way that one is preferred over the other based on the utility each 
alternative provides (Fishburn 1970, 2). Often, the relationship between the value and its 
utility can be defined mathematically, resulting in a utility function with a shape 
determined by the decision maker's risk attitude (Kirkwood 1997, 3). The investigation 
undertaken by this author assumes an exponential utility function and, while no further 
discussion has been presented due to restrictions in scope, it is a common selection for risk 
attitude-based utility theory research (Blais and Weber 2006; Van Bossuyt et al. 2012). 
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The utility function compares the relationship between multiple sets of choice 
outcomes and, based on the nature of the relationships being investigated, the utility of the 
figure of merit (often assumed to be dollars in utility theory research although not 
exclusively) may increase or decrease depending on the utility value of the choice 
outcomes. For instance, with regard to operational availability, increased reliability (value) 
results in increased availability (utility). This kind of relationship is generally assumed to 
be monotonically increasing (Kirkwood 1997). However, some figures of merit, such as 
mean time to repair, are inversely related to operational availability. The increased time 
spent in the conduct of maintenance actions adversely impacts the overall availability of 
the system and the relationship is thus monotonically decreasing. These two relationships 
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where 𝜌 represents risk tolerance (Kirkwood 1997, 6). The high and low values form the 
upper and lower bounds of the value in question. The depth of the function’s curve when 
graphically plotted is dependent on the value of ρ. As shown in the equation, a larger value 
of ρ results in a less pronounced curve, while a smaller value results in a curve that is more 
pronounced, further exemplified in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Monotonically Increasing and Decreasing Relationships. 
Source: Kirkwood (1997). 
The above chapter has provided the foundation and understanding necessary to 
introduce the main contribution of this thesis in the following chapter. It has provided 
discussion on reliability, risk attitudes, utility theory, all of which are essential for 




This chapter presents a methodology synthesizing the concepts of reliability, risk 
attitudes, and utility theory to quantify otherwise qualitative characteristics of SOMs as 
they relate to operational availability. The ultimate goal of this process is to use the 
information to improve the operational availability characteristics of a system through 
design. The process consists of four main steps providing the engineer with a risk-attitude-
adjusted insight into the system’s “utility” accompanied by a final step which may be taken 
by systems engineers that uses the output of the previous four steps to inform any necessary 
iterations to the system design process: 
1. Identify key characteristics of the system. 
2. Determine the risk attitudes of SOMs. 
3. Develop the utility function. 
4. Evaluate the utility of the system. 
5. If necessary, implement adjustments to, or redesign, the system. 
As systems engineering is an iterative and recursive process, should the engineer 
require execution of the fifth step, it may be necessary to perform steps four and five until 
reaching a satisfactory outcome as shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Methodology 
A. STEP 1: IDENTIFY KEY SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
The first step in determining how risk attitude impacts the operational availability 
of a system is to identify some of the key system attributes. Relevant attributes in 
determining the operational availability of a system include reliability, maintainability, and 
supportability characteristics. This method focuses on the reliability characteristics of the 
system as the mechanism by which risk attitudes affect operational availability. 
The reliability of the system is determined by the characteristics and arrangement 
of the constituent components. As previously discussed, components can be arranged in 
series, parallel, or a combination thereof. Due to the nature of system reliability 
27 
calculations, each successive component placed in series decreases the overall reliability 
of the system. For this reason, it is common to design systems in a series-parallel 
combination, placing multiple components in parallel at points in the system where 
individual components are more likely to fail. 
The reliability characteristics of each component are multiplied against each other 
pursuant to the overall reliability equations government by component arrangements to 
determine the system's overall reliability level. This overall reliability level is the “value,” 
x, of the utility function. 
B. STEP 2: DETERMINE RISK ATTITUDES OF SOMS 
The next step of the method is to understand the aspirational risk attitudes of the 
personnel involved with the operation and maintenance of the system beginning with first 
selecting an appropriate risk attitude test. Five sub-steps occur within Step 2 to determine 
the risk attitudes of the SOMs including 1) select risk assessment tool, 2) determine risk 
attitudes, 3) determine relative risk impact, 4) calculate risk coefficient, and 5) identify 
SOMs. 
1. Select Risk Assessment Tool 
In the case where aspirational system design is desirable, an aspirational risk 
attitude test is prescribed. Aspirational risk attitude tests are generally psychometric 
surveys such as the DOSPERT and E-DOSPERT while predictive risk attitude tests are 
often choice lottery-based (Blais and Weber 2006; Van Bossuyt et al. 2012; 2013). For the 
purposes of this research, the author takes the stance that aspirational system design is more 
appropriate than predictive system design, and thus warrants the use of a psychometric risk 
survey. This is because systems engineers and SOMs are aspiring to design and operate 
systems with higher operational availability by influencing system design through the 
analysis of risk attitudes. This is in line with what (Van Bossuyt et al. 2012) did for 
aspirational space mission designs.  
While some evidence exists that custom tailored psychometric risk surveys are most 
appropriate to understand specific domains of risk attitudes, such as within a person’s 
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private life or professional life, developing a psychometric risk survey specifically tailored 
for SOMs within the context of naval vessels is beyond the scope of this thesis (Blais and 
Weber 2006; Van Bossuyt et al. 2013). Instead, the author advocates for practitioners to 
use either the DOSPERT or E-DOSPERT psychometric risk surveys to gain a high-level 
understanding of SOM risk attitudes. If further refinement of analysis conducted from the 
method presented in this chapter is desired, a tailored psychometric risk survey may be 
justified. Development of a psychometric risk survey is outside the scope of this thesis; 
information on developing psychometric risk surveys can be found elsewhere (Armstrong 
and Overton 1977; Fisher 1993; Fisher and Tellis 1998; Lusk and Norwood 2010; 
Moshagen et al. 2014).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the DOSPERT test is used. The DOSPERT test 
covers five domains of risk-taking/aversion including ethics, finance, health/safety, 
recreation, and social. While the DOSPERT test and the five domains were developed from 
a personal, private life risk attitude perspective, these domains are generally well-aligned 
with potential broad domains of risk attitudes of SOMs at their jobs. This research is echoed 
in the investigations of decentralized decision-making in structural health monitoring 
systems as well as military operational risk taking (Valkonen and Glisic 2019; Momen et 
al. 2010). 
2. Determine Risk Attitudes 
To determine each SOM’s individual risk attitudes in each of five domains of risk, 
the SOM is given a questionnaire asking for his or her perception of various scenarios 
involving risk-based decisions. The results of the questionnaire are then analyzed to 
identify his or her risk attitudes in relation to each domain. The risk attitude information is 
then translated into a set of coefficients indicating his or her risk tolerance or aversion in 
each domain. 
For purposes of calculations performed in this method, the range of possible risk 
attitudes is set between -1 for completely risk averse to 1 for completely risk tolerant. Van 
Bossuyt et al. (Van Bossuyt et al. 2012), used a -3 to 3 scale in their work; however, the 
scales can be renormalized around any cardinal number set. A value of 0 indicates 
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completely risk-neutral decision-making. Table 1 provides an example of a SOM's personal 
risk attitude composition across the five risk domains from the DOSPERT test. In this 
instance, the SOM is risk averse in two domains, risk seeking in two domains, and risk 
neutral in a single domain. 
Table 1. Example Personal Risk Attitude Composition 
Risk Domain Value (nominal) Risk Attitude 
Ethics -0.2 Risk Averse 
Finance 0.2 Risk Seeking 
Health/Safety 0.1 Risk Seeking 
Recreation 0 Risk Neutral 
Social -0.3 Risk Averse 
 
3. Determine Relative Risk Impact 
While an individual’s risk attitude in each domain has an impact on the operational 
availability of the system, the impacts are not uniformly consistent across the set of 
domains for a given value. For instance, an individual’s desire for social acceptance may 
lead him or her to decision-making that has a significant impact on the system he or she 
maintains, whereas his or her risk attitude in the recreation domain would be 
inconsequential. While readily understandable using intuition and engineering judgement, 
there is limited research available to provide quantitative data for these relative impacts; 
however, the method presented in this thesis has the ability for systems engineers or other 
decision-makers to include such effects. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to quantify 
rigorously how a relative risk impact score is developed. This is an area that requires future 
work to be more rigorously developed. However, the method presented in this thesis is 
targeted for use during the system architecture phase of design as a tool for better 
understanding what impact risk attitudes of SOMs have on operational availability and, 
while quantitative in nature, is not intended to be used as a hard-and-fast decision-making 
tool. Instead, the method presented here is meant to be used to better inform decisions made 
about system design and maintenance concept. Table 2 provides a representative set of 
potential relative risk impact levels for a generic situation with reference to maintenance 
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on board a naval vessel. A practitioner using this method is advised to develop relative 
impact scores appropriate to the system under analysis. 
Table 2. Risk Domains with Relative Impact Levels 







4. Calculate Risk Coefficient 
After determining both the SOM’s individual risk attitude in each of the domains, 
as well as noting the impact the domain itself has on operational availability, multiplying 
the two values together yields a domain-specific risk-decision impact. Upon determining 
the values for each domain, summing them together provides a single value which is 
representative of the SOM’s overall risk attitude and expected impact on the reliability of 





where n is the risk domain, Tn is the risk tolerance in domain n, and In is the risk impact of 
that domain on reliability. Reducing the set of domain values to a single number is useful 
for several reasons including its ability to be used as a scaling factor in a utility function. 
Van Bossuyt et al. (2012; 2012) advocated for a similar combination of multiple risk 
domains in situations where direct mapping from risk domains to a specific risk-informed 
design decision cannot be made. In the context of operational availability of naval vessels 
and when using DOSPERT or a similar psychometric risk survey that is not specifically 
tailored to answer naval vessel operational availability questions, this author suggests that 
it is appropriate to combine multiple risk domains together into one risk coefficient only 
after considering the relative risk impact levels of each risk domain. 
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5. Identify SOMs 
Depending on the situation, ρ may be best defined by a single individual SOM’s 
Rtot or by taking the average across a pool of SOMs’ Rtot results. The decision only to 
analyze one individual versus a group of SOMs should be based on whether many SOMs 
work on a specific system or if one dedicated SOM will work on that system. 
If many SOMs will work on the same system, analysis of risk attitudes across the 
domains of risk utilizing DOSPERT may reveal similar risk attitudes among the various 
factors within a group of SOMs. Alternatively, the analysis may reveal large standard 
deviations within the domains indicating disparate risk attitudes. Given a sufficiently low 
standard deviation, using the average risk attitude of the SOMs may be desirable for 
encapsulating SOM risk aversion or risk seeking at a high level. 
While this approach works with any group of SOMs, analysis of certain subsets of 
personnel prove more useful than others. For instance, an engineer may survey all 
personnel who do a specific kind of maintenance on a specific class of ship, or a 
representative subset of them. Depending on the magnitude of deviation from an average 
score, the population can be said to have a relatively homogeneous risk attitude connoting 
confidence in any subsequent risk impact determination. Conversely, large deviations 
suggest the average risk attitude to be of low utility as an input to the risk utility function. 
In the case of naval vessels for which this method is specifically tailored, this author 
suggests averaging Rtot across a representative respondent pool of SOMs that may serve 
aboard a vessel of interest. This is in line with how current naval personnel and staffing 
actions are taken where the vast majority of systems are operated and maintained by many 
different individual SOMs and no one system is the sole purview of one individual SOM. 






where n is the number of SOMs being analyzed and Rtot_x is the Rtot value for SOM x. 
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Due to the nature of engineered systems, the risk tolerance coefficient does not 
remain constant over the entire spectrum. Systems with very high or very low nominal 
availability remain relatively unaffected by risk tolerance. Systems with extremely low 
reliability levels are relatively unaffected by the SOM as inherent availability, and therefore 
operational availability, is already poor. Similarly, systems with extremely high reliability 
levels are relatively unaffected by SOM risk attitudes due to the decreased need for 
maintenance corresponding to decreased human-system interaction. Conversely, systems 
with moderate reliability levels are more susceptible to negative impacts from risk-seeking 
decisions due to the interaction between the higher inherent availability over low reliability 
systems from the presence of better components and the increased human-system 
interaction incurred by the maintenance requirements of systems with moderate reliability 
levels. These two factors combine in such a way that risk decisions have a more significant 
impact on system reliability (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 485–90). This author suggests 
quantification using Equations 11 or 12, depending on the “value” by which the 
investigator wants to estimate the system’s “utility.” Using utility theory to determine the 
impact on system operational availability avoids the complexities of multi-objective 
optimization in determining the impact of risk decisions on the system (i.e., reliability, 
maintainability, suitability, supportability, economic viability) (Hazelrigg 1996). Since this 
research has been undertaken to understand how risk attitudes affect the operational 
availability of a system, this author has chosen to focus on reliability as a parameter of 
measure as risk attitudes as many of the other factors contributing to the system's 
operational availability are, at least indirectly, related to the system's reliability. In 
nominally holding each of the other parameters constant, this author utilized reliability as 
the single parameter of value to revise the system's utility (operational availability). 
C. STEP 3: DEVELOP THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
Since reliability is the parameter (value) by which the utility function provides 
insight into the expected operational availability (utility) of the system, the relationship is 
monotonically increasing and defined by Equation 11 (Kirkwood 1997, 6). Adaptation of 





















where 𝜌 is the risk coefficient, which is inversely related to the risk tolerance of the SOM; 
the value, x, is the reliability of the system; and the utility [u(x)] is the risk-adjusted impact 
to the expected operational availability of the system. Two further sub-steps must occur to 
fully develop the utility function and are detailed below. 
1. Inversion and Application of a Scaling Factor 
Evident in Equation 15, increasing the value of ρ produces a less pronounced curve, which 
incorrectly associates increased risk-attitude with decreased impact on the system. 




 , (16) 
where 𝜌 indicates the depth of the utility function, Rtot represents the overall risk attitude 
of the SOM, and Fs represents a scaling factor indicating the impact of risk attitudes on 
system reliability. While the scaling factor can be empirically derived given the right 
information, in the absence of quantitative historical data, exact determination of the 
scaling factor has been reserved for future work. This is similar to how Van Bossuyt et al. 
(2012) and others have treated scaling factors in previous utility theory-based risk attitude 
work. Having now obtained both x and ρ, Equation 15 solves for the risk adjusted “utility” 
of the system. 
2. Graphical Representation (The Utility Curve) 
The relationship between the reliability of a system and its utility is shown in Figure 
7, with more risk seeking attitudes deviating further from risk neutral and producing more 
pronounced curves. Recall from the previous step that the value of ρ is inversely related 
risk attitude; therefore, increased risk attitude diminishes the value of ρ, thereby producing 
a more pronounced curve. This author has given a notional 1:1 relationship between 
reliability and system utility, the positive correlation characteristic of a monotonically 
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increasing system. Exemplified, this indicates that for a system with a nominal reliability 
of 90%, the utility of the system, given a risk-neutral SOM, is also 90%. However, for a 
risk-seeking SOM, the utility would be diminished according to the magnitude of the 
SOM's risk attitude, as defined in Equation 14. Note that the curves depicted in Figure 7 
are likely more extreme than what would be typically observed based on the literature (Van 
Bossuyt 2012); however, this author has chosen to display them in this manner to 
demonstrate how the magnitude of ρ can significantly change the utility of a specific 
decision set for a given value. Risk seeking attitudes that are shown in red, while risk-
averse attitudes are shown in brown. Although the various levels of risk aversion are 
depicted in the figure for completeness, as previously discussed, this author has stipulated 
that risk aversion as it pertains to reliability is equivalent to risk neutrality. This is based 
on the understanding SOMs exhibiting either risk neutral or risk averse attitudes will all 
exhibit the same levels of procedural compliance, namely, full compliance. Low levels of 
risk aversion or risk seeking are represented by dotted lines, moving to dashed lines and 
then to solid lines as the aversion or seeking increases in magnitude. 
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D. STEP 4: EVALUATE THE SYSTEM 
Possessing the information from the utility function, the engineer is able to 
determine the effect of a SOM or group of SOMs’ risk attitude on system utility. For 
instance, a system designed with an objective reliability of 95% has a risk neutral utility of 
95%, but if the outcome is adjusted to account for a risk-seeking SOM, it may be that the 
risk-attitude adjusted utility is 92%. While the objective utility of the system is defined as 
95%, if the threshold utility for that system is 90%, a risk-attitude adjusted utility of 92% 
may be sufficient and fail to trigger iteration of the design process. However, if the 
objective and threshold values are equal or the stakeholder has sufficient motivation to 
achieve the objective design requirements rather than threshold requirements, system 
redesign may be the desired course of action. 
The information obtained from the risk-adjusted profile is used as an informative 
tool during the iteration and recursion of system design to ensure these stakeholder 
requirements are met based on the outcome of the utility function; however, this author 
notes that redesign need not only include physical alteration of the system. Several other 
options, which may be more practical depending the system's location in the SE process, 
do not address the issues from a reliability perspective, but from a maintainability, or 
supportability perspective. For example, efforts could be made to utilize specialized 
training to reduce the system's mean time to repair. Additionally, efforts to reduce 
administrative or logistics delays may prove of use in boosting the system's operational 
availability levels; however, if any combination of these methods proves insufficient, it 
may be necessary to address the problem by addressing the risk attitudes of the SOM. A 
more thorough discussion of options is reserved for Chapter V. 
E. STEP 5: ADJUST SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
If the engineer decides to redesign the system, he or she will choose new system 
components and/or alter their configuration. As discussed in the previous section, design 
may be an iterative process. Notionally, based on the utility function, it is possible to 
determine the necessary system reliability for a given utility and SOM risk attitude; but 
this author must reemphasize that although this process attempts to quantify otherwise 
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qualitative data, the complex and interdependent nature of the many factors contributing to 
a system's operational availability limit implementation of this model in an exclusively 
quantitative manner. Rather, this model is designed to be used as a reference tool to aid in 
the process of system design. After the new system has been designed, the engineer will 
determine the revised system reliability and obtain a new system utility from the utility 
curve. If the outcome is still unsatisfactory, the process with continue to iterate. This 
iteration process is essentially a repetition of steps 4 and 5 until attainment of a satisfactory 
outcome. 
F. SUMMARY 
This author has presented a methodology for the development of the model as well 
as provided a short discussion of how the outputs of the model can be used by systems 
engineers to inform design decisions. Given reasonable estimates of the impact of risk 
decisions on system reliability, the only necessary data to utilize this method are risk 
attitude information of expected SOMs, which can be obtained by questionnaire, and the 
reliability data of the system in question, which is already used to determine system 
reliability. The following chapter provides an example of this methodology applied to a 
simple series-parallel system. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE METHOD 
This chapter provides an example scenario demonstrating how a risk-attitude-based 
approach to human systems integration is applied by systems engineers concerned with 
improving the operational availability of their systems. The example is applied to a generic 
system broadly representative of a system which may be found aboard naval vessels and 
shows the implementation of the model discussed in the previous chapter. 
A systems engineer has been assigned to a project team developing a system to 
support various maritime operations with operating periods of 500 hours. Over these time 
periods, the system must maintain high levels of operational availability. To support these 
requirements, the systems engineer has determined the system requires a threshold 
reliability level of at least 90%. 
A. STEP 1: IDENTIFY KEY SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
The system used for this analysis is a notional four-component system with a series-
parallel configuration. The component reliability data for the system are representative of 
a system with reasonable reliability levels. 
1. Component Data 
Table 3 shows notional parameters for the system components. The MTBF value 
accounts for the inclusion of a preventive maintenance plan. The reliability data are based 
on the operating period of 500 hours. 
Table 3. Component Reliability Data 
Time (Hours) 500   
Component MTBF (Hours) Failure Rate Reliability 
1 14000 0.000071 0.964916 
2 16500 0.000061 0.970152 
3 8000 0.000125 0.939413 
4 15000 0.000067 0.967216 
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Component three has the highest failure rate, mitigated only by the component 
configuration. 
2. Component Configuration 
The system has four components, the third of which has a parallel redundancy as 
shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Example Component Configuration RBD 
3. System Reliability 
To find the overall reliability, the below equation can be used to match the 
reliabilities of the components to their layout. 
𝑅𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑅1(𝑅2)(𝑅3𝐴 + 𝑅3𝐵 − (𝑅3𝐴)(𝑅3𝐵))(𝑅4) 
= 0.965(0.970)(0.939 + 0.939 − 0.9392)(0.967) 
= 0.902 
Given this reliability, one could expect that given a risk neutral system 
operator/maintainer in full compliance with the maintenance plan, the system would 
achieve roughly 90% reliability, meeting the threshold requirement for reliability. 
B. STEP 2: DETERMINE RISK ATTITUDES OF SOMS 
This example uses the DOSPERT test to analyze the risk attitudes of the SOMs. 
Determination of risk attitude using DOSPERT contains four to five sub-steps depending 
on whether the system has a single or multiple SOMs; however, the number of sub-steps 
may differ depending on the risk assessment tool the engineer chooses to utilize. For this 
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example, the outputs for sub-steps 2.1 through 2.5 have been summarized in Table 4, but a 
discussion of the explicit execution of the sub-steps is given in the previous chapter. While 
DOSPERT is capable of measuring the risk attitude of a single person, greater utility is 
found in analyzing the risk attitudes of a pool of SOMs. This is especially true in the case 
of naval systems, where the individuals responsible for operating and maintaining the 
systems are distributed among the divisions, departments, or even the entire crew. 
Table 4 shows a notional average risk attitude composition summary for the group 
of personnel responsible for operating and maintaining the system shown in Figure 8. As 
shown in Table 4, negative risk attitude values have been reassigned a value of zero to 
represent the equivalence of risk averse attitudes with risk neutral risk attitudes. This author 
used a scaling factor of one and solved for the ρ value according to Equation 16 with Rtot 
representative of the average total risk attitude of the group. 
Table 4. Risk Attitude Summary 
Risk Domain Raw Risk Attitude Adj Risk Attitude Risk Impact 
Ethics 0.8021 0.8021 1.2 
Finance -0.7397 0.0000 1.1 
Health/Safety 0.8750 0.8750 1.5 
Recreation -0.3131 0.0000 0.5 
Social 0.5581 0.5581 1.35 
    
R_raw R_tot_avg Rho F_s 
0.447 0.606 -1.651 1 
 
C. STEP 3: DEVELOP THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
After defining the system characteristics to obtain the “value,” x, and determining 
the raw risk attitudes, impact-adjusted risk attitudes, population average risk attitude, and 
scaling factor to find the value of ρ, the systems engineer has all of the necessary 
components to generate the utility function. Although the SOMs are risk averse in finance 
and recreation, their moderate social risk seeking coupled with significant risk seeking in 
ethics and health/safety result in a significant effect on system reliability. For a system with 
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a nominal 85% reliability, with a reasonable scaling factor of one, the risk-attitude adjusted 
system utility would be approximately 81%. The example system has a reliability of 90.2% 
which has a risk-attitude-adjusted utility of just over 87% as shown in Equation 17 and 
depicted by Figure 9. 







= 87.31%. (17) 
 
Figure 9. Risk-Adjusted Reliability as a Function of Nominal 
Reliability 
D. STEP 4: EVALUATE THE SYSTEM 
Given the threshold reliability of 90%, this means the system and associated 
processes, as designed, are insufficient to achieve threshold reliability levels. For a system 
utility of 90%, assuming the risk data remains constant, solving for “value” indicates the 
redesigned system must have a reliability of at least 92.33%. To ensure the system achieves 
the desired utility, the engineer must find a method to improve the reliability of the system 
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E. STEP 5: ADJUST SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES 
Having already determined the required reliability value for the adjusted system, 
the engineer is presented with several options to improve the system. Improvement of 
system reliability will require modification of either the system or the maintenance concept. 
Depending on the nature of the components, component design is an effective method of 
influencing the reliability characteristics of the system. For a system with a configuration 
that is malleable, adding components in parallel to boost reliability levels in that subsystem 
is often a cost-effective way to improve reliability. If the design is less flexible, replacing 
the components with others of higher reliability levels may be suitable. However, it should 
be noted that components with abnormally high reliability levels is often prohibitively 
expensive and is typically used for systems where no other alternative is available. Finally, 
modifying the maintenance concept to include more preventive maintenance may be able 
to improve reliability through extension of the components’ MTBFs. For improvements in 
operational availability other than reliability improvement, the systems engineer may 
consider changing how SOMs are interacting with the system (i.e., training, changing the 
SOM). A further discussion of these recommendations is provided in the following chapter. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given a system with insufficient utility when accounting for SOM risk attitude, the 
engineer must provide a path to achieve the necessary utility or the system should not be 
produced. Fortunately, there are several ways to compensate for the unsatisfactory utility, 
though not all of the methods require altering the system components. This is especially 
important for systems, which have already been fielded and are in the operational phase of 
the system lifecycle. However, for engineers designing new systems to be fielded, early 
analysis provides information to the engineer in adequate time to incorporate material 
changes. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Below is a brief discussion of these changes followed by a few other considerations 
should material changes be prohibitive. 
1. Modify the System 
Among the several ways of improving performance through system modification, 
there are two main methods. The first of which, although costly, would be to get better 
components. Better components with higher MTBFs yield better inherent reliability, even 
if that reliability requires a larger capital investment. A second method of redesign, which 
may be less expensive depending on the stage of the system life cycle, would be to change 
the component configuration. Adding redundancies and spares as appropriate has the 
potential to significantly increase the overall reliability of the system. Furthermore, these 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It may be beneficial to spend more money for 
certain parts which are already expensive, but then redesign the configuration to place some 
of the less expensive parts in a parallel configuration. 
2. Redesign the Maintenance Concept 
Another method to addressing the issue of decreased reliability would be to make 
modifications to, or completely redesign, the maintenance concept. Since preventive 
maintenance has the potential to effectively increase the MTBF of system components, a 
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more robust, if more manpower-intensive, method would be to adjust the frequency or type 
of preventive maintenance. Depending on the system and the original maintenance concept, 
there may be potential for a substantial increase in reliability. A maintenance plan resulting 
in a 50% greater MTBF yields the following shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. MTBF Extension by Maintenance 
Standard Configuration 
Time (Hours) 500   
Component MTBF (Hours) Lambda Reliability 
1 14000 0.000071 0.964916 
2 16500 0.000061 0.970152 
3 8000 0.000125 0.939413 
4 15000 0.000067 0.967216 
  System Reliability 0.90210155 
    
Improved Maintenance Concept 
Time (Hours) 500 MTBF Extension 50% 
Component MTBF (Hours) Lambda Reliability 
1 21000 0.000048 0.976472 
2 24750 0.000040 0.980001 
3 12000 0.000083 0.959189 
4 22500 0.000044 0.978023 
  System Reliability 0.93435329 
 
As evidenced by the table and using the same equation for reliability using the new 
effective values for MTBF, the system reliability improves by just over 3%. 
3. Other Considerations 
Training is an effective way to reduce a system’s mean time to repair, which would 
provide more system “uptime.” Additionally, efforts may be undertaken to make 
improvements to administrative and logistics requirements. This could include reducing 
administrative overhead, streamlining the paperwork routing processes, and/or using 
administrative methods utilizing more automation. Logistically, keeping replacement parts 
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on hand reduces any logistics delay and ready spares may be able to reduce system 
diagnostics prior to corrective maintenance. 
4. Replace the SOM 
If no combination of these methods allows the system to reach the desired 
operational availability, perhaps it is unattainable without a less risk-seeking SOM. This 
author is aware of two options, though information surrounding the desirability and/or 
efficacy of either is beyond the scope of this investigation. The first method is to attempt 
to influence the psychology of the SOMs in such a way that their risk attitudes become 
acceptable. If changing the risk attitudes of the SOMs proves infeasible, the situation may 
warrant replacing the SOM with one who is less risk seeking. This is often difficult for 
many reasons to include the appearance of targeting specific groups whether intentional or 
unintentional, constraints on time to obtain replacements, or expenses associated with 
replacement. Finally, it simply may be that the position requires a great deal of specialized 
training which is difficult to acquire. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This author's investigation into the effects of risk attitude on system operational 
availability has revealed some potential areas for future research. The first area of research 
this author proposes is an investigation into the applicability of the dimensions of 
DOSPERT as applied to the military. While DOSPERT is meant to be field independent, 
no exhaustive study has been done demonstrating universality. Given sufficient time and 
resources, it may be worthwhile to conduct research into the applicability of DOSPERT in 
specific fields across DOD. One such outcome of the research would be the relative risk 
impacts of each of the risk domains as applied to various functions within DOD, such as 
maintenance, ORM, or development of local standard operating procedures. 
Another possible avenue of investigation is into the consistency of risk attitudes 
within DOD. An analysis of sufficient sample size should reveal the presence, or absence, 
of common factors across a variety of metrics to include age, type of duty (sea or shore), 
duty location, gender, age, and point in the ship's lifecycle among others. Furthermore, the 
investigation should include an analysis of risk attitude consistency over time. If the risk 
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attitude of a population shifts appreciably over the life of the system, and if it changes in a 
consistent and predictable manner, such information should be taken into consideration 
during system design. Finally, as verification of this method was demonstrated using 
notional data, future work should focus on data collection for full validation of the method. 
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